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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRETRIAL, TRIAL
AND APPEAL
Kerry P. FitzGerald*

I.

INTRODUCTION

his Article reviews significant decisions of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and Texas Courts of Appeals in the area of criminal pretrial, trial, and appellate procedure during the Survey period.
II.

PRETRIAL

A.

Bail

In Ex ParteJonesI the appellant argued that he was entitled to have his
bail, set by the district court, at $550,000 combined for murder and capital
murder charges, reduced to an amount that he could meet, $14,000. Pursuant to his writ of habeas corpus, a hearing was held and the court reduced
the bond to $105,000.2 The appellant utilized article 17.151 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure 3 to argue that he must be released on personal
bond or a reduced surety bond if the State was not ready for trial within 90
days from the commencement of his detention. The legislative purpose of
this article was to assure that an accused would not be held in custody indefi-4
nitely while the State was not at least prepared to bring the accused to trial.
The court of appeals held that the prosecutor's announcement that the State
"has been" ready for trial was not sufficiently definite to show it was ready
within the designated time. 5
The court of criminal appeals acknowledged and distinguished Meshell v.
State 6 which held the Speedy Trial Act 7 unconstitutional, emphasizing that
in this case the only consequence was a salutary one within an accusatory
system that embraces the presumption of innocence until an accused is
proven otherwise. 8 The basic reasoning was that an accused, incarcerated
and as yet untried, should not suffer the incidental punitive effect of incarcer*

B.B.A., Southern Methodist University; L.L.B., University of Texas. Attorney at

Law, Dallas Texas.
1. 803 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

2. Id. at 713.
3.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 17.151 (Vernon Supp. 1992).

4. Jones, 803 S.W.2d at 715.
5. Id at 717.
6. 739 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
7. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32 A.02 (Vernon 1989)

8. Jones, 803 S.W.2d at 716.
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ation during any further delay attendant to prosecutorial exigency. 9 The
amount of the bond was not solely determined by the ability of the accused
to post bond; at the same time, an unprepared prosecutor does not risk having the entire prosecution set aside as would have been the case under the
Speedy Trial Act.' °

Ultimately, the court found on this state of the record that it was not
within the trial court's discretion to find that the State was timely ready for
trial. The appellant was entitled to "be released either on personal bond or
by reducing the amount of bail required." 1 ' The cause was remanded to the
habeas court for further proceedings.
In Bills v. State' 2 the court upheld the denial of bail under article I, section 1 (a) of the Texas Constitution, which provides that a person accused of
a felony less than capital, committed while on bail for a prior felony, may be
denied bail if the order is issued "within seven calendar days subsequent to
the time of incarceration of the accused."' 13 The appellant was arrested and
incarcerated on April 5, 1990, and the order denying bail issued on April 12,
1990. The appellant began his count as of April 5th, whereas the correct
calendar count commenced with the first day after the date of the act, or
beginning April 6th. "The established rule in this State... is that when time
is to be computed from or after a certain day or date, the designated day is to
be excluded and the last day of the period is to be included unless a contrary
intent is clearly manifested .... ,,14
B.

Motion To Recuse

A defendant's motion to recuse the presiding judge must be filed at least
10 days before the date set for trial, stating grounds why the judge before
whom the case is pending should not sit in the case. Is The defendant in
DeBlanc v. State' 6 did not timely file his motion to recuse, and thus could
not avail himself of article 200(a), section 6, of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, that provides in part that the "district judge shall request the presiding
judge to assign a judge of the Administrative District to hear and assign
17
motions to recuse such district judge from a case pending in his court.'
The court held that because the defendant failed to comply with the 10-day
notice provision of rule 18(a), he was barred from complaining on appeal of
the denial of a separate hearing before another judge on the motion to
8
recuse.
In Cantu v. State' 9 the defendant argued on appeal that first, the trial
9. Id.
10. Id.
11.

Id. at 719.

12. 796 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
13. Id at 195.
14. Home Ins. Co. v. Rose, 255 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Tex. 1953).

15. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18 (a).
16. 799 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2912 (1991).

17. 1d. at 705.
18. Id.
19. 802 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, pet. ref'd).
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judge should have recused herself, and second, the trial judge was constitutionally disqualified to hear the case because of her prior attorney-client relationship with the defendant in another matter. On the first point, the court
of appeals held the complaint was waived because the appellant voluntarily
pled guilty to the offense without benefit of a plea bargain, and thus all nonjurisdictional defects were waived. 20 The court, likewise, did not find the
trial judge constitutionally disqualified simply because the judge had represented the defendant on a previous unrelated matter. 21 The court acknowledged that since the judge was a former defense attorney, this case might
present a more sensitive situation than if the judge were a former prosecutor.
Nonetheless, this should not be an automatic disqualification whenever the
attorney-client privilege is asserted. The privilege must first be claimed, and
22
it is waived when the holder of it does not make a timely objection.
C.

Motion To Sever

23

In Wedlow v. State the defendant was indicted for aggravated robbery
and for burglary of a habitation, involving different complainants. After the
defendant's motion to sever was overruled, both indictments were tried
before the same jury. The court of appeals distinguished the statutory right
to severance under section 3.04 of the penal code, 24 relied upon by the parties, from the right to severance when the State decides to prosecute indictments arising out of the same or different criminal episode in a single jury
trial, the latter of which applied in this case. 25 The court cited abundant
legal authority for the proposition that if a defendant objects to being tried
on more than one indictment at the same time before the same jury, the trial
court must sever, primarily because of the defendant's valuable right of a
trial before an impartial jury guaranteed by article I, section 10 of the Texas
26
Constitution.
The court stated that the trial court's failure to grant the defendant's mo27
tion for severance was a procedural error, but one of major consequences.
Although the error is not in violation of a mandatory statute, it is a
pretrial error which permeated the entire trial: how the parties voir
dired the jury; the witnesses called by both sides; the testimony elicited
from witnesses; the admissibility of evidence; appellant's decision to testify; and even argument at the punishment phase of the trial. The right
which is implicated by this error is appellant's constitutional right to a
28
trial before a fair and impartial jury.
The court, citing Sodipo v. State 29 held that the error was of a type not
20. Id. at 350.

21. Id. at 351.
22. Id.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

807 S.W. 2d 847 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd).
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.04 (Vernon 1974).
Wedlow, 807 S.W.2d at 850.
Id. at 851.
Id. at 852.

28. Id.
29. 815 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
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subject to a harm analysis. Alternatively, the court did attempt to apply a
harm analysis and found that the error affected the integrity of the process
leading to the conviction, particularly because it forced the defendant to de30
fend himself against two charges at the same time before the same jury.

The court noted that the impact of two indictments, two complainants and
two verdicts upon the same jury was unquantifiable. 3' "To many jurors, two
complainants are more believable than one. The jury may have believed that

if appellant committed one of the offenses, he must have committed the
other."' 32 Thus, notwithstanding the lack of a harm analysis in the Anders
33
brief filed by appellant's counsel, the court of appeals reversed.

D.

ChargingInstruments

The period reviewed included numerous instances in which appellate
courts addressed a myriad of problems associated with indictments.
Courts initially disposed of challenges to charging instruments on proce-

dural grounds. In Trujillo v. State 34 the court rejected a challenge to a criminal information which had not been brought to the attention of the court
before the trial date as required by the Code of Criminal Procedure. 35 In
Meador v. State36 the court easily dispensed with the appellant's motion to
quash, finding that it was not even submitted in writing as required by the
37
Code of Criminal Procedure.
Many of the rules maintain their same viability. The indictment must
charge an offense in plain and intelligible words with such certainty as to
enable the accused to know what he will be called upon to defend against
and to enable him to plead any judgment in bar of further prosecution for
the same offense. An indictment is generally sufficient if it charges an offense
in the terms of the statute. 38 A motion to quash must be granted, however,
if the language in the indictment concerning the defendant's conduct is so
vague or indefinite as to deny him effective notice of the acts he allegedly
committed. The indictment need not plead evidence the State intends to rely
39
upon at trial.
In Young v. State4° the defendant contended that the indictment did not
indicate which of the conjunctively alleged theories of aggravated robbery
the State intended to rely upon in the prosecution. Distinguishing Ferguson
30. Wedlow, 807 S.W.2d at 852.

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 853.
34. 809 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no pet.).
35. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.14(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
36. Meador v. State, 811 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1989), aff'd, 812 S.W.2d 330
(Tex.Crim. App. 1991)
37. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 27.10 (Vernon 1989). See Meador, 811 S.W.2d at
615.
38. Clark v. State, 796 S.W.2d 551, 553 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no pet.); Smith v. State,
811 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd).
39. Epps v. State, 811 S.W.2d 237, 243 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no pet.)
40. 806 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, pet. ref'd).
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v. State4 1 and Drumm v. State42 the court held that the indictment contained only one count charging the appellant with aggravated robbery. 4 3 An
indictment containing two paragraphs, alleging different means by which an
offense was committed, under a single statutory theory, was not subject to a
motion to quash. 44
In Ex PartePena4 5 the appellant contested his convictions for burglary of
a habitation in aggravated robbery on the basis that they were misjoined in
the same indictment in violation of section 3.01 of the Texas Penal Code.
While the court recognized that both of these offenses were "offenses against
property" under title 7 of the Penal Code, each offense was a distinct statu46
tory offense and thus they could not be joined in the same indictment.
Thus, the State could not obtain more than one conviction on the
47
indictment.
The court in Ex Parte Pena set out what it denominated as the five predominant methods used in determining which conviction to uphold and
which to dismiss, in an attempt to sort out the appropriate relief to be
granted the applicant: (1) to choose the offense that the defendant was convicted of first; (2) to affirm the conviction that had the lowest number on the
charging instrument; (3) to choose the offense that was alleged first in the
indictment; (4) to choose the conviction which had more proof; or (5) to
randomly affirm one and dismiss the other conviction. 48 In Ex Parte Pena
the court ultimately decided that it was an appropriate case for adopting and
applying the most serious offense test in determining which conviction to
uphold. 49 As the aggravated robbery conviction was the more serious of the
two offenses because of the parole considerations, the court affirmed that
50
conviction.
In Studer v. State" the appellant argued for the first time on appeal that
the information alleging indecent exposure was fundamentally defective as it
failed to allege the acts relied upon to constitute recklessness in compliance
with article 21.15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 52 The court analyzed
the amendments to article IV, section 12 and article 1.14 and held that the
definitions of indictment and information in the Texas Constitution did not
require that each constituent element of an offense be alleged to have a valid
charging instrument investing the trial court with jurisdiction, 3 Thus,
while the information did not allege acts constituting recklessness, generally
41. 622 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
42. 560 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
43. Young, 806 S.W.2d at 343-44.
44. Id. at 344.
45. Ex Parte Pena, Nos. 71,246, 71,247, 1991 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 276 (Tex. Crim.
App. Dec. 11, 1991).
46. Id. at *3.
47. Id.
48. Id. at *4-*5.
49. Id. at 06.
50. Id. at *8.
51. 799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
52. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.15 (Vernon 1989)

53. Studer, 799 S.W.2d at 272.
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a defect of substance, the defendant's failure to object to this defect pretrial
54
waived the error on appeal.
The changes wrought by article 1.14(b) require that exceptions as to form
and substance be raised pretrial or otherwise the accused has forfeited his
right to raise the objection on appeal or by collateral attack. 55 Judge Miller,
writing for the court, emphasized that no longer does the constitution or
56
statutory law require that all elements of the offense be in an indictment.
In Rodriguez v. State 57 which involved a conviction for evading arrest, the
defendant again complained for the first time on appeal (during oral argument) that the information was fundamentally defective for failing to allege
that the defendant knew the peace officer was attempting to arrest him when
he fled. Admittedly, the failure of the charging instrument to allege an element of an offense was a substantial defect, but the information was on its
face an information which invested the trial court with jurisdiction. 58 The
court held that the defendant had waived this defect under article 1.14(b)
59
because of his failure to object before the date on which the trial began.
In Ex ParteGibson 6o the applicant argued that the indictment upon which
he was convicted was fundamentally defective for failing to allege the date of
the commission of the alleged offense, under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 6 1 The indictment alleged a date of September 3, but omitted a year.
The date of the offense was September 3, 1987. The defendant did not give
notice of appeal. Once again, the court, relying on Studer 62 emphasized
that "if the instrument comes from the grand jury, purports to charge an
offense and is facially an indictment, then it is an indictment for purposes of
Art. V., § 12(b), and its presentation by a State's attorney invests the trial
court with jurisdiction to hear the case."' 63 The court concluded that since
the defect in the indictment was one of form or substance, and as the applicant failed to object to the defect pretrial, the applicant could not now raise
the defect for the first time in this post-conviction proceeding." The court
did observe that "[iun Studer. . we noted that the amendment to Art. 1.14
did not change what constitutes a substance defect but rather only the effect
of a substance defect. That is, no longer will an unobjected to substance
defect be 'fundamental error.' ",65
54. Id. at 273.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 272.
57. 799 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).

58. Id. at 303.
59. Id.
60. 800 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
61. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.02 (Vernon 1989).
62. Studer, 799 S.W.2d at 272.
63. Gibson, 800 S.W.2d at 551.

64. Id.
65. Id.; St. Peter v. State, 811 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1991, no pet.)
(argument that indictment for indecency with a child was fundamentally defective for failing
to allege that appellant engaged in sexual conduct with a child, when indictment did specify
that appellant did "touch the genitals" of the victim, waived because appellant did not object
before the date of trial); State v. Oliver, 808 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (corn-
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On the other hand, in several misdemeanor cases, Studer was distinguished. In State v. Edwards66 the court held that the misdemeanor theft
information was fundamentally defective in that it showed on its face that
the limitation period had elapsed before its presentment and it failed to plead
facts tolling the statute. 67 "A fundamentally defective information is void,
does not effectively invoke the court's jurisdiction over the defendant, and
will not support a conviction."'6 The lack of a motion to quash did not
69
waive this fundamental defect.
0
In Aguilar v. State 7 the court held that the discrepancy in dates between
the body of the complaint for DWI and the jurat rendered the complaint
72
invalid and vitiated the information. 71 The court distinguished Studer,
particularly as the defect in the case would not appear on the charging instrument and was not subject to the provisions of article 1.14 of the Code of
73
Criminal Procedure or article V, section 12 of the Texas Constitution.
Rather, the defect related to the process by which the charging instrument
was generated and therefore related to the jurisdiction of the trial court in
the face of a void pleading. The court emphasized:
In the case of an indictment, the fact that fewer than the required
number of grand jurors voted in favor of a true bill, failure of the actual
foreman to deliver the bill, forgery of the foreman's signature or even
inadvertent signing and returning of a bill in a case not reviewed by the
Grand Jury are fundamental defects in the charging instrument process
which would vitiate the instrument, vitiate trial court jurisdiction and
be subject to first complaint on appeal despite the failure to present objection prior to trial on the merits. The defect in the underlying complaint in this misdemeanor
case is analogous to those types of
74
jurisdictional defects.
In several cases, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals examined the impact of article 28.10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides:
(a) After notice to the defendant, a matter of form or substance in an
indictment or information may be amended at any time before the date
the trial on the merits commences. On the request of the defendant, the
court shall allow the defendant not less than 10 days, or a shorter period if requested by the defendant, to respond to the amended indictment or information.
plaint as to narcotic indictments omitting any reference to a culpable mental state waived);
Gibson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (complaint in narcotic case that
indictment failed to specify the year in which the alleged offense occurred waived). Ex Parte

Morris, 800 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (complaint that forgery indictment omitting allegation that writing purported to be the act of another who "did not authorize the act"
was waived by failure to object at trial).
66. 808 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1991, no pet. h.).
67. Id. at 664.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
810 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, pet. granted).
Id. at 231.
Studer, 799 S.W.2d at 272.
Aguilar, 810 S.W.2d at 231.
Id. at 232.
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(b) A matter of form or substance in an indictment or information may
also be amended after the trial on the merits commences if the defendant does not object.
(c) An indictment or information may not be amended over the defendant's objection as to form or substance if the amended indictment or
information charges the defendant with an additional or different offense or if the substantial rights of the defendant are prejudiced. 75
In Sodipo v. State76 prior to jury selection, the prosecutor moved to
amend the cause number only in the enhancement paragraph of the indictment, and was permitted to do so over objection that the defendant was
entitled to an additional 10 days to prepare for trial.
The court in Sodipo held that article 28.10(a) was mandatory in nature
and that the court erred in denying the defendant an additional 10 days
time. 77 The 10 day requirement "cannot be subjected to a harm analysis in
any meaningful manner, because the record will not reveal any concrete data
from which an appellate court can meaningfully gauge or quantify the effect
78
of the error."
In Hillin v. State 79 the defendant was charged with aggravated assault on
a correctional officer in two separate indictments, each of which alleged the
defendant committed the offense by causing bodily injury to the victim "by
throwing porcelain." The defendant's strategy was to attack the allegation
describing the substance utilized to commit the aggravated assault. To
counter his strategy, the prosecutor sought to amend the indictments by alleging that the manner and means used to accomplish the aggravated assault
was by throwing a commode. Over the defendant's objections, the trial
court granted the State's motion to amend and ordered the indictment
amended by delineation. 80
Article 28.10(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows the State to
amend the indictment after a trial on the merits has commenced unless the
defendant has interposed a timely objection to the attempted amendment.
The court emphatically held that if the defendant, after trial on the merits
has commenced, interposes a timely objection to the State's proposed
amendment, be it to form or substance, such amendment is absolutely prohibited. The court summarily rejected the approach of the court of appeals,
which applied a substantial rights analysis under article 28.10(c), prohibiting
the State from amending the indictment if such amendment transformed the
allegations to additional or different offenses or prejudiced the substantial
rights of the defendant.8 1
In Flowers v. State8 2 the indictment charged the defendant with theft of oil
field equipment. At a pretrial hearing, the defendant argued that his motion
75. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.. art. 28.10 (Vernon 1989).

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

815 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
Id.
Id.; see also Young v. State, 796 S.W.2d 195, 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
808 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Id. at 487.
Id.
815 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
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to quash the indictment should be granted because the State had failed to
allege all of the necessary elements of theft, and specifically how the appropriation was unlawful. Thereafter, the State amended the indictment changing the name of the owner of the property and expanding on a statutory
element of culpability tracking section 31.03(b)(3) of the Penal Code.
The court of appeals found that the amendments violated article 28.10(c)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure because both changes charged a different
offense than that found by the grand jury. 3 The court of criminal appeals
held that the additional language tracking the Penal Code provision merely
added evidentiary matters but did not change any essential element of the
theft; in this case, the change of the owner's name did not allege a different
offense.8 4 A different offense means a different statutory offense. 85
However, the court also analyzed the defense objections in terms of
whether they did prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant similar to
the approach utilized in Adams v. State.8 6 In this case all of the parties knew
that the amendment dealt with the same occurrence of theft as that alleged
prior to any amendment and, therefore, there was no prejudice to any substantial rights.
However, the court did observe that:
[i]t is possible that an amendment such as changing the owner might
reflect an entirely different incident as the basis for the allegation. If
this were so, the 'substantial rights' provision of Art. 28.10(c) would be
implicated to protect the defendant, and the right to indictment by a
grand jury under Art. V, § 10 might be implicated. For example, if the
record shows that the amendment is made so as to charge a different
occurrence or incident than that originally alleged in the indictment,
the substantial rights of a defendant would be prejudiced in part because he has been denied any grand jury review of the offense as required by Art. I, Section 10.87
Thus, the same argument advanced in Flowers might very well be viable in a
different context in the future.
The amendments of charging instruments affecting the identity of the victim have been addressed in several other cases. In Ward v. State8 8 the defendant was charged with burglary of a building. The owner was named as
Seth Haller. Before trial, the State filed a written motion to amend the indictment to change the owner's name to Steve Scott. The defendant signed
this motion, waiving the additional ten days to prepare for trial and notice of
the amendment. While the district court granted the motion and ordered
the indictment amended, the State made no changes or interlineations on the
indictment itself. On appeal, the defendant argued that because the State
failed to physically amend the indictment, it was never amended and thus
83. Id. at 726.
84. Id. at 731.

85. Id. at 730.
86. 707 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
87. Flowers, 815 S.W.2d at 729.
88. 804 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, pet. granted).

1602

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

the evidence which showed Steve Scott as the building owner was insufficient
to show Seth Hailer as the owner, as alleged in the original indictment. The
court, on appeal, held that the trial court's order on the motion sufficiently
apprised the defendant about that which he was charged and constituted a
sufficient order memorializing the substance of the amendment.8 9 Thus the
amendment was effectively amended. A trial court itself can amend an indictment. 90 Interestingly, the court in Collins v. State9 held the opposite,
that is, that an amendment occurs only when an indictment is physically
92
changed.
In Rose v. State 93 the defendant was initially indicted for aggravated assault on a correctional officer named Neal. Subsequently, the State amended
the indictment by changing the victim's name to Kornacki. The method of
injury was also amended from pushing him to pushing him to the floor. On
appeal the defendant contended that the amended indictment charged him
with an additional or different offense and prejudiced his substantial rights in
violation of article 28.10(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court
agreed that the change violated article 28.10(c) and the Texas Constitution's
grand jury requirements contained in article I, section 10 and article V, section 12(b). 94 An indictment must allege on its face those facts necessary to
show the offense was committed, bar a subsequent prosecution for the same
95
offense and give the defendant notice of exactly what he is charged with.
While the original indictment in Rose met the certainty requirements of article 21.04 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a conviction for assaulting the
victim Neal would not bar trial on a charge of assaulting the victim
Kornacki and, therefore, the amendment changed the offense in violation of
article 28.10.96
In Brown v. State97 the arson indictment alleged the owner's name to be
Yolander Evette Weeks, whereas the proof showed the owner's first name to
be Yolanda. After the State rested, appellant's motion for an instructed verdict, based upon the misspelling of the complainant's first name, was denied;
the State's oral motion to strike the first name Yolander from the indictment
as surplusage was granted. 98 The court's instructions gave the owner's name
as Evette Weeks and omitted any instruction on the law of idem sonans.
The State's amendment in this case happened after the commencement of
the trial and over the defendant's objections. The court held that the decisions of the court in Hillin v. State,99 State v. Sodipo, 10 and Beebe v. State 10 1
89. Id. at 206.
90. Id.
91.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

806 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd).

Id. at 580.
807 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no pet.).
Id. at 629.
Id.
Id.
No. 1187-90, 1991 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 248 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 20, 1991).
Id. at *2.
808 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
815 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
811 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
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in the aggregate, "stand unmistakably for the proposition that no breach of
article 28.10 should be tolerated in the trial court, regardless of its probable
effect on the outcome of trial, and that no speculation about the impact of
10 2
such an error under Rule 81(b)(2) should be attempted on appeal.
The court in Brown, remanded the case to the court of appeals for reconsideration. 10 3 The court of appeals had originally found the error to be
harmless error. 10 4 The court of criminal appeals, however, observed that
upon remand, "it might be well for the court of appeals to consider, if adequately briefed, whether the word "Yolander" was, indeed, surplusage and,
if so, whether the removal of surplusage from an indictment constitutes an
10 5
amendment within the meaning of article 28.10, V.A.C.C.P."'
In State v. Murk' 0 6 a public lewdness case, the defendant argued that the
information was fundamentally defective because it failed to allege a culpable mental state, a defect in substance which existed only because the State
amended the information on the date of trial by deleting certain phraseology.
Thus, Murk was not an article 1.14(b) case (requiring defendant to object
before date of trial), but rather was an article 28.10 case (requiring defendant
to object to the amendment or waive the error), and thus the court said its
10 7
decision to grant review under article 1.14(b) grounds was improvident.
The court observed that the action of the State was really not contemplated or addressed by the statute. "While the State is permitted to amend
with notice up until the day before trial commences and after the trial commences the statute does not address day of, but before the trial commences
....[t]he State did what was not permitted nor did it follow the mandates of
a clear statute."' 0 8 However, the defendant failed to properly object at trial
and thus waived the error on appeal.' 0 9
In Beebe v. State 11the court permitted the State to amend its terroristic
threat pleadings, following which the defendant made known to the court
that the defendant was entitled to more time to prepare for trial. The court
held that the trial court was required to grant the additional time mandated
by article 28. 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure upon request."'I
In Collins v. State 12 the State's motion to strike words was granted at a
pretrial hearing. The motion was aimed at the aggravated sexual assault
conviction alleged in the enhancement paragraph, in order to strike the term
aggravated. The defendant objected and requested an additional ten days to
prepare his defense under article 27.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
102. Brown, 1991 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 248, at *5.
103. Id.
104. Brown v. State, 800 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990) rev'd, No. 1187-90, 1991
WL 241689 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 20, 1991).
105. Brown, 1991 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 248, at *2.
106. State v. Murk, 815 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

107. Id. at 558.
108. Id. at 559.

109. Id.
110. 811 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

111. Id. at 606.
112. 806 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd).
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which was denied. While the State's motion to amend was granted pretrial,
the district court did not physically amend the indictment until before the
punishment phase of the trial. The district court recognized the defendant's
prior objection, before permitting the actual amendment to be made to the
indictment and the court, on appeal, found the defense objection to be sufficient and the reliance by the defendant upon article 27.12 rather than article
28.10 to be inconsequential because both demanded ten days extra prepara13
tion time in view of the amendment."
However, in Trujillo v. State 114 the court found that the defendant waived
any error under article 28.10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 15 On the
trial date, the State sought to amend the information to correctly reflect the
complainant's name by including the last letter of her first name. While the
defendant objected to the amendment as contrary to article 28.10, the defendant did not seek ten days to respond to the amended information.
The court reviewed a number of instances in which the defendant filed
exceptions to the charging instruments. In Swope v. State 116 the court considered the question of whether a defendant who was indicted only as a party
to the commission of an offense (in this case, theft by deception) committed
by another, was entitled to notice of the manner and means of the acts which
he allegedly committed which allegedly subjected him to party responsibility. The court held that under section 7.02 of the Penal Code, sufficient
notice to prepare a defense is given to a party to an offense by allegations of
the underlying offense itself, and the facts which make a person criminally
responsible for the conduct of another are evidentiary and need not be pled
7
in the indictment. 1
However, in State v. Carter 118 the court held that the defendant's motion
to quash the information on the ground that it failed to provide adequate
notice of the offense charged should have been granted. 119 The information
alleged in part that the defendant "did . . . unlawfully while intoxicated,
drive and operate a motor vehicle in a public place," but did not specify
what definition of intoxicated the prosecutor would rely on at trial. 120 A
charging instrument must, in the face of a motion to quash, allege specifically which definitions of intoxicated the State will prove at trial (the one
under article 6701 1-1(a)(2)(A) or under article 6701 1-1 (a)(2)(B)). 12 1 Once
again, the court applied the principle that even though an act or omission by
an accused is statutorily defined, if that definition provided for more than
one manner or means to commit that act or omission, upon timely request,
the State must allege the particular manner or means it seeks to establish, in
113. Id. at 580.
114.

809 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no pet.).

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 595.
805 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Id. at 444-45.
810 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Id. at 200.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 200.

1992]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:PRETRIAL

1605

order to convey adequate notice from which the accused may prepare his
defense. 122
In Fullbright v. State 123 the defendant was indicted for aggravated robbery in each case, and each indictment contained an enhancement paragraph
alleging a prior conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, using the same case number. The defendant filed a motion to quash the enhancement allegation, arguing that the conviction was void because the
court-ordered probation, given in the case, was not authorized for the offense
of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The court found the defect
rendered the sentence void, and applied the harmless error analysis pursuant
to Rule 81 (b)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. 124 In Harrisv.
State' 2 5 the court ultimately held that based upon the testimony of the witnesses, the arguments of counsel making reference to this prior conviction,
as well as the jury's review of the pen packet and the finding of the enhancement allegation as true, the court was unable to conclude beyond a reason1 26
able doubt that the error did not contribute to the punishment assessed.
However, as the error was committed in the punishment phase, only a new
127
punishment hearing was required under article 44.29(b).
Finally, the matter of sufficient notice as to the finding of a deadly weapon
was addressed in Powell v. State. 128 The defendant in Powell was charged as
a party to the offense of aggravated robbery. In part, the indictment alleged
that the defendant requested and attempted to induce someone other than
himself to use and exhibit a deadly weapon. At the close of the evidence,
during the punishment stage, the court made an affirmative finding of the use
of a deadly weapon. This issue was not submitted to the jury at the
guilt/innocence phase of the trial. The court held that as an affirmative finding of the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon could not apply to a party of
an offense unless he personally utilized the weapon, the allegations in the
indictment were insufficient to provide adequate notice. 129 Although the defendant did not lodge an objection when the court made its ruling, the court
concluded that there were some errors so egregious that an Almanza review 130 cannot save them.'31 The court found the defendant did not waive

the issue on appeal.'

32

122. Id. at 199. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10. See also Ferguson v. State, 622 S.W.2d 846
(Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Sullivan v. State, 817 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
123. 818 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
124. Id. at *5.
125. Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)
126. Id. at 589.
127. Id.
128. 808 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, no pet.).
129. Id. at 104.
130. See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)(whether the lack of
notice so infected the procedure as to render it unfair).
131. Powell, 808 S.W.2d at 105.
132. Id.
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E. Double Jeopardy
The constitutional protections against double jeopardy provide protection
against: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and, (3) multiple
punishments for the same offense.' 33 It is well settled that the successful
appeal of a judgment of conviction on any ground other than the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict poses a bar to further prosecu34
tion on the same charge.'
In Blakely v. State 135 the court observed that Blockburger v. United
States 136 addresses the multiple punishments component of double jeopardy
whereas Grady v. Corbin 137 addresses the multiple prosecutions component.
Blockburger set out the test as follows:
[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether
there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires
138
proof of a fact which the other does not.
In Grady v. Corbin a motorist under the influence of alcohol caused an
accident in which another person was killed. After the motorist was convicted of DWI, the State prosecuted for vehicular manslaughter. DWI was a
lesser included offense of vehicular manslaughter and therefore the defendant argued that this second prosecution violated his Fifth Amendment right
to be free from double jeopardy.
In Grady the Supreme court initially applied the Blockburger test. 139 The
court noted that if the application of the test revealed that the offenses had
identical statutory elements or that one was a lesser included offense of the
other, then the inquiry should cease and the subsequent prosecution was
barred.14 As the DWI and vehicular manslaughter each had a unique element, they were not the same offense under the Blockburger analysis.
The Supreme Court next held that when a person is subjected to successive prosecutions, the subsequent prosecution and conviction must do more
than merely survive the Blockburger test. 141
The court specifically held that:
As we suggested in Vitale, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars any subsequent prosecution in which the government, to establish an essential
element of an offense charged in that prosecution, will prove conduct
that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been
prosecuted. This is not an 'actual evidence' or 'same evidence' test.
133. Ex Parte Fortune, 797 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S.
410 (1980).

134. Harris v. State, 738 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), cert. denied, Harris v. Texas,
484 U.S. 872 (1987).; Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400 (1987)(per curiam).
135. 814 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, pet. ref'd).
136. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
137. 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
138. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
139. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2090.
140. Id.
141. Id.at 2093.
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The critical inquiry is what conduct the State 142
will prove, not the evidence the State will use to prove that conduct.
In State v. Comerford 143 the court emphasized that the test in Grady v.
Corbin I" "require[d] the reviewing court to look to the 'underlying conduct' to determine whether: (1) this is conduct constituting an offense;
(2) the defendant has already been prosecuted for this offense; and (3) this
'criminal conduct' will be used to establish an essential element of the offense
charged at the subsequent prosecution. 'Only if the conduct meets all three
parts of this test will the latter prosecution be barred by double
jeopardy.' ",145
The court in Grady concluded that the State, largely in view of its admission that it would depend on the same conduct in a subsequent trial, was
barred from trying Corbin on the felony indictments after being adjudicated
146
guilty on the misdemeanor charges arising out of the same accident.
However, the court also indicated that this holding would not prevent a successive prosecution on the felony charges if the bill of particulars showed
that the State would not rely on proving the conduct for which Corbin had
147
already been convicted.
The defendant in Ex ParteFortune 148 was convicted in a single trial on
two counts under one indictment for the offenses of burglary of a habitation
with intent to commit sexual assault and aggravated sexual assault. 149 A
jury set punishment at fifteen years imprisonment on the burglary conviction
and thirty years on the sexual assault conviction. The burglary conviction
was affirmed but the sexual assault conviction was reversed on double jeopardy grounds. 150 Subsequently, the defendant was reindicted and he pled
guilty to the aggravated sexual assault case pursuant to a plea bargain.
There was no direct appeal. In this case, the defendant contended there was
a violation of the double jeopardy clause because of this reindictment and
conviction, after the initial reversal. The court stated that the defendant's
slate was wiped clean by the court's finding that the indictment was fatally
flawed as to a portion of the pleading.' 5 1 The court held that the double
jeopardy clause presented no bar for the government's retrial of the defendant who was successful in setting aside this first conviction because of an
error in the proceedings leading to the first conviction.' 5 2 Grady v. Corbin
was distinguished because in the instant case, the conviction was earlier re142. Id.
143. 812 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991, no pet.).
144. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2093.
145. Comerford, 812 S.W.2d at 669 (quoting Ex Parte Ramos, 806 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991)).
146. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2094.
147. Id.
148. 797 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
149. Id. at 930.
150. Fortune v. State, 699 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985), aff'd, 745 S.W.2d
364 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
151. Ex Parte Fortune, 797 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
152. Id. at 936.
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versed at the appellate level. 153
In Sanchez v. State 154 the court reiterated that the Fifth Amendment's
double jeopardy clause did not prohibit the defendant's prosecution in one
trial for aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery charged in two indictments because the clause only applied to successive prosecutions, not to
a single prosecution for multiple offenses. 155 Defendants may be prosecuted
in a single trial for as many offenses as are committed in a criminal
episode. 156
157
In a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn.
Once double jeopardy does attach, the defendant possesses a valued right to
have his guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact. 158 An
exception to this rule exists if the defendant consents to a retrial, or if a
retrial before a new jury is mandated by some form of manifest necessity. 159
In State v. Torres 160 the court held that in bench trials, jeopardy attaches
when both sides have announced ready and the defendant has pled to the
charging instruments, under the Texas Constitution article I, section 14.161
In Ex ParteHubbard162 after a jury was selected, sworn in and impaneled
for trial, the defendant made an oral motion to compel the State to elect
between the counts in the indictment based upon misjoinder of the offenses
of burglary of a habitation and burglary of a motor vehicle. The State, acknowledging that the counts may have been misjoined, wanted to proceed
with the evidence and then make its selection when the charge was given to
the jury; but it requested that the jury be dismissed as the jury had been told
of the two offenses during voir dire. The defendant objected to any mistrial
because the jury was impaneled and he was ready to proceed. The court
granted the defendant's first motion to compel the State to elect a count, and
at the same time, granted the State's motion to dismiss so that the trial could
be reset. 16 3 After the court granted a mistrial, the jury was dismissed.
The issue before the court in Hubbard was "whether a mistrial declaration, over objection, after the jury is sworn, bars retrial of both offenses when
defendant has asked for an election by the State of the offense on which it is
to proceed.' 164 The court initially observed that the defendant in Hubbard
had followed the correct procedure in making a motion to elect the count
upon which the State would proceed. 165 In Fortune the court held that
when the State violated the misjoinder rule by alleging different offenses in
153. Id. See Lockhart v. Nelson, 109 S. Ct. 285 (1988).

154. 813 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st. Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd).
155. Id. at 612-13.
156. Id. at 613.
157. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 31 (1978); Torres v. State, 614 S.W.2d 436, 441 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1981).
158. Torres, 614 S.W.2d at 441.

159. Id.
160.
161.
162.
163.

805 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Id. at 421.
798 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
Id. at 799.

164. Id.
165. Id. at 800 (citing Fortune v. State, 745 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)).
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the same indictment, the defendant basically had three options.166 The defendant could object to the charging instrument on the ground that the State
had misjoined the offenses. The court should then grant the motion to quash
167
or could force the State to elect the offense upon which it would proceed.
The second option was to forego the motion to quash and file a motion requesting that the State be made to elect the count upon which it would proceed. The trial court should grant the motion if the State has misjoined
offenses. 168 The State must make the election by the end of the State's case
to
and before the defense begins to present evidence. The third option was
1 69
appeal.
on
error
the
urge
and
objection
or
quash
to
make no motion
In Hubbard1 70 the State never made an election as to which count it
would proceed and evidence was not presented on either count. The trial
was over before it began when the jury was dismissed by the court.' 7 1 In this
situation, the offenses must be treated the same. Thus, the State was barred
from prosecuting either offense contained in the indictment. 172
F. Motion To Shuffle
Notwithstanding the clear provisions of article 35.11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 7 3 which gives the defendant an absolute right to a jury
shuffle, the denial of this right was litigated in Scott v. State. 174 The defendant filed a timely motion to shuffle. The trial court directed the bailiff to
shuffle the information cards without request from either the State or the
defendant; the defendant's request was brought up only just prior to the
State's commencement of the voir dire examination. The court emphasized
that even had the defendant's request been before the trial judge when the
bailiff shuffled the cards, this type shuffle of did not satisfy the defense request because the defendant had the right to see the jury panel seated, in the
75
proper sequence, before he decided whether to exercise his right to shuffle. '
In Scott the defendant was denied an opportunity to see the panelist seated in
sequence before he exercised his right to a shuffle and thus the judgment was
reversed. '

76

In Urbano v. State 177 the defendant tried to mix apples and oranges when
the defendant complained that a Batson hearing 178 should have been conducted following the State's request for a jury shuffle. However, the court
was not inclined to expand the Batson holding to this extent, particularly
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Fortune, 745 S.W.2d at 368.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hubbard, 798 S.W.2d at 798.
Id. at 800.
Id.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 35.11 (Vernon 1989)
805 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no pet.)
Id. at 614.
Id.
808 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no pet.).
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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because the defendant had the absolute right to demand the jury be reshuffled after being brought into the court room and failed to do so. 179
III. TRIAL
A. Guilty Pleas
This period saw several cases revolving around complaints that a plea bargain agreement was not honored after the defendant entered his plea of
guilty before the court.
In Ex ParteBittikoffer 180 the defendant pled guilty to four separate felonies. The plea bargain agreement called for the defendant to complete the
special alternative to incarceration program (the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's boot camp program), after which the defendant was to be
placed on probation. The defendant successfully completed his program but
the trial court lost jurisdiction and could not administer the rest of the plea
agreement. The defendant sought to have his guilty pleas set aside. The
district court found that the loss of jurisdiction was not the fault of the defendant or his attorney and that the defendant's guilty plea was involuntary
because the terms of the plea bargain agreement could not be fulfilled. 81
The State agreed that the relief sought was proper. Thus, the judgments and
sentences were vacated and the causes remanded to the district court. l8 2
In Gibson v. State 183 the defendant sought dismissal of the indictment in
his second case. When the defendant pled guilty in his first felony case pursuant to a written plea bargain agreement with the prosecutor, he did so in
exchange for "40 years TDC, no finding of use or exhibition of a deadly
weapon; Dismiss (cause number) 15,653-A". 1 4 The second case was never
dismissed. On the contrary, the defendant was tried and found guilty and
sentence was set at twenty years imprisonment and a fine. The defendant
challenged that conviction based upon breach of the plea bargain agreement.' 85 The court held that when a guilty plea rests to any significant degree on a promise of the prosecutor, such that it can be said that the promise
is part of the inducement or consideration for the plea of guilty, the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that such promise be
fulfilled.' 8 6 If the prosecutor does not carry out his side of the bargain, the
defendant is entitled to have the agreement specifically performed or the plea
withdrawn, which ever remedy is most appropriate.' 8 7 In this case, as the
defendant had served a substantial portion of the sentence imposed under
the guilty plea, the only appropriate remedy was specific performance. 188
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Urbano, 808 S.W.2d at 520.
802 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Id. at 702.
Id.
803 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Id. at 317.

185. Id. (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971)).
186. Id. at 318.

187. Id.
188. Id.
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In Heath v. State 189 the defendant pled guilty to aggravated robbery and
was placed on ten years probation pursuant to a plea bargain agreement.
Subsequently, the State moved to revoke the probated sentence, and following a hearing, the district court revoked the probation and sentenced the

defendant to eight years imprisonment. The court thoroughly discussed the
State's estoppel theory based in a trilogy of cases beginning with Popham v.
State119 and overruled Popham and its progeny.1 91 The court found the sentence, not authorized by law, to be void and held that in plea bargain situa-

tions where specific performance is not an alternative, the only remedy is to
order the plea withdrawn and to return the parties, including the State, to
their original positions.192
A somewhat different scenario was presented in Levy v. State 193 wherein
the defendant, without benefit of a plea bargain, pled guilty to aggravated
sexual assault. The court found the defendant guilty and set punishment at
six years imprisonment, then probated the sentence. 1 94 At a subsequent probation revocation hearing, the court sentenced the defendant to six years
imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court erred
in revoking his probation because he should have never been granted probation for his aggravated sexual assault conviction, as he was not eligible for
court ordered probation under article 42.12 section 3(g)(a)(1)(C). Noting
that a defect which renders a sentence void may be raised at any time, the
court held that in cases where a defendant enters a guilty plea, or a plea of
nolo contendere without the benefit of a plea bargain agreement with the
State, and the trial judge assesses a punishment unauthorized by law, the
appropriate remedy is to allow the finding of guilt to remain and to remand
the case to the trial court for the proper assessment of punishment.' 95
In Lemmons v. State 196 the defendant, pursuant to a plea bargain, pled
guilty to DWI and was sentenced to jail and a fine. The trial court denied
the defendant's motion to suppress, which was the subject matter of this
appeal. The court of appeals noted that the defendant pled guilty and that
no evidence was introduced supporting the plea. The court held, in part,
that the defendant failed to present a record which showed that the evidence
sought to be suppressed was later used to determine his guilt and therefore,
the error was waived; however, because the plea of guilty was found to be
conditioned on the defendant's being able to appeal, the plea was found to be
97

involuntary. 1

The Court of Criminal Appeals in Lemmons 198 determined that Rule
40(b)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure did not preclude appeal
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

817 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
228 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 1950).
Heath, 817 S.W.2d at 339.
Id.; Shannon v. State, 708 S.W.2d 850, 852 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
Levy v. State, 818 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
818 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

197. Id. at 59.
198. Id.
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from the denial of pretrial motions prior to the entry of a negotiated plea in
misdemeanor cases and that the "particularized 'extra notice' requirement"
of Rule 40(b)(1) applied only to felony cases. 199 The court reversed and
remanded to the court of appeals for consideration of the motion to suppress
2°°
point contention.
B. Jury Selection
In Nunfio v. State201 the court addressed the propriety of denying the
defendant the right to question the jury panel as to whether they could be
fair and impartial if the victim was a nun. Without question, both the State
and the defense believed the evidence which showed that the victim of an
aggravated sexual assault was a nun. The State filed a motion in limine
which the trial court granted, directing the defendant not to discuss the occupation or vocation of the victim. After the motion was granted, the defendant specifically asked: "Can I use a hypothetical fact situation, if the
victim is a nun, could they be fair and impartial?" The trial court refused to
20 2
allow the question.
The court observed that the question which the defendant posed sought to
determine potential bias or prejudice in favor of the victim by virtue of her
vocation. 20 3 The court observed that similar inquiries had been held to be
20 5
proper in Abron v. State 204 and Hernandez v. State.
The court held that "error in the denial of a proper question which prevents the intelligent exercise of one's peremptory challenges constitutes an
abuse of discretion and is not subject to a harm analysis under Rule
' '2 6
8 1(b)(2). 0
In Cadoree v. State 207 defense counsel posed to the jury panel the following question, to which the State's objection was sustained: "Our hypothetical bar and you know that there is a gun up on the shelf. Do you think it
could be - somebody could strike that person from the rear to keep them
from getting that gun or weapon as acting in self-defense?" 20 8 The court
held that while the question was in proper form, the question improperly
"sought to commit prospective jurors to the particular facts of this case.
That is, whether a person can act in self-defense by shooting someone in the
back. Indeed, this was the ultimate issue in the case."' 20 9 The court emphasized that while courts should permit questions designed to determine a ju199. Id.
200. Id.
201. 808 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
202. Id. at 484.
203. Id.
204. 523 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975)(whether it would make a difference that the
black defendant was accused of raping a white victim).
205. 508 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)(could jurors believe a police officer might lie
under oath).
206. Nunfio, 808 S.W.2d at 485.
207. 810 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd).
208. Id. at 788.
209. Id. at 789.
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ror's views and sentiments on various social and moral subjects, courts do
not permit a hypothetical case to be submitted nor allow questions designed
210
to bring out the juror's views on the case at trial.
C.

Opening Statement

The court of appeals revisited the apparently troublesome question concerning the right of a defendant to make an opening statement in Arriaga v.
State.2 11 At the conclusion of the State's opening argument, the defense
counsel asked to make an opening statement, which the trial court denied.
At the conclusion of the State's evidence, defense counsel waived making an
opening argument. Reviewing the defendant's right to make an opening
statement under article 36.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in view of
the harmless error rule, the court noted that the focus of the procedural
provision was not whether a defendant may make an opening statement but
rather when the statement may be made. 2 12 The choice is solely that of the
defendant; the trial court has no discretion in the matter. The court held
that because the defendant was not able to have the jury evaluate the State's
evidence in the context of the defense position as that evidence was being
heard, and as the defendant was not able to have the jury relate the defense
cross-examination of the State's witnesses to the overall defense posture as
the cross-examination was being conducted, the State failed to show, beyond
21 3
a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to the conviction.
D. Jury Participation
In two recent cases, the subject of jury note taking was considered. In
Hubbard v. State214 after jury selection and prior to the beginning of evidence, the trial court provided notebooks to the jurors and instructed the
jurors that they would be allowed to take notes if they chose, and permitted
the notebooks to be taken into the jury room during deliberations. The defendant did not object to the use of the notebooks during the trial but did
object to the notebooks being utilized during jury deliberations.
The court in Hubbard cited Hollins v. State 2 15 for the proposition that the
Texas Criminal Appeals has simply declined to lay down any hard and fast
rule on this subject. 216 The court ultimately concluded that the jury notes
per se were not viewed as injecting additional evidence outside the record,
and the court found no harm in the jury's having and using them during
deliberations. 2 17
210. Id.
211. 804 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, pet. ref'd).
212. Id. at 273.
213. Id. at 276.
214. 809 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1991, pet. granted), overruled by Grunsfeld v.
State, 813 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. granted).
215. 571 S.W.2d 873, 881 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
216. Hubbard, 809 S.W.2d at 320.
217. Id. at 321.
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The decision in Williams v. State 218 likewise recognized that there was no
Texas case holding "that permitting jurors to take notes or to use those notes
'
during their deliberations is proper or that such practice results in error. "219
The court actually commended the practice, stating that if note taking by
jurors would assist them, the practice should be permitted under appropriate
conditions and admonitions. 220 The court, in addition, suggested that the
trial court instruct the jury that jurors' notes are not to be considered as
evidence and that in the event of disagreement, the jury should request the
disputed testimony be read from the official record. 221 The court found very
tenuous any preference for reliance based upon the memory of a juror over
what a juror writes on a piece of paper.
On March 28, 1991, the Houston court of appeals delivered two very interesting opinions dealing with jury questioning of a witness. In Buchanan v.
State 222 after a witness was questioned by the respective attorneys, the trial
court asked the jurors if they had any questions to ask the witness and had
the jurors write down those questions. After the jury was retired to the jury
room, the judge read the questions and allowed the respective attorneys to
lodge any objections as to hearsay, relevancy, etc. The only objection made
by defense counsel was to the entire process. The jury then returned to the
courtroom and the judge asked the witness the questions tendered and then
permitted counsel to ask any follow-up questions desired. The court held
that the defendant was afforded great procedural protection in the manner in
which the questioning was conducted and that no harm was shown. 223 The
procedure followed was certainly consistent with the rules in Texas governing the mode and order of interrogation of witnesses and presentation of
224
evidence.
In Allen v. State225 the court first observed that article 36.01 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure did not provide for or permit questioning by jurors of
the witnesses, but also did not necessarily present a comprehensive list of all
events which may occur during a trial. 226 The general rule in most other

jurisdictions is that it is within the trial court's discretion to permit this type
of practice. 227 Because of the carefully structured procedure followed in the
case, the court found no abuse of discretion in permitting jury
228
questioning.

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

814 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. App.-Houston
Id. at 164 (discussing Hollins v. State,
Id. at 166.
Id.
807 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. App.-Houston
Id. at 646.
Id.
807 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. App.-Houston
Id. at 640.
Id. at 641.
Id. at 642.

[14th Dist.] 1991, pet. granted).
571 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)).

(14th Dist.] 1991, pet. granted).

[14th Dist.] 1991, pet. granted).
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Violation of "The Rule"

In Gordon v. State 229 the defendant invoked "the rule" at the beginning of
trial and the witnesses were appropriately instructed. 230 During the trial,
the defendant objected to certain testimony because two State's witnesses
had been seen communicating. The court noted that the purpose of "the
rule" was to prevent corroboration, contradiction and the influencing of witnesses. 23' Thus, if a violation was shown, the court must determine if the
233
violation resulted in harm. 232 No such harm was shown in Gordon.
In Davis v. State234 the issue concerned the disqualification of a defense
witness, and any possible conflict with the defendant's constitutional right to
have witnesses testify in his defense, as guaranteed by article I, sections 10 &
19 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the petition for
discretionary review and subsequently vacated the judgments of the court of
appeals and remanded the cases to the court of appeals for consideration of
the defendant's point of error number two, which was unrelated to the subject matter cited herein. 235 The court of appeals, on original submission, had
overruled point of error number two on procedural grounds. The court of
appeals relied upon the two prong test for appellate review enunciated in
Webb v. State,236 in determining whether a trial court has properly exercised
its discretion in excluding the testimony of a witness who violates "the rule."
In Davis 237 the court reiterated that where the rule has been violated and
the witness disqualified, the appellate court must determine: (1) whether
there were particular circumstances, other than the mere fact of the violation, which would tend to show the defendant or his counsel consented, procured, or otherwise had knowledge of the witness' presence in the
courtroom, as well as knowledge of the content of that witness' testimony;
and (2) if no particular circumstances existed to justify disqualification, was
the excluded testimony crucial to the defense? The court found that the
defendant failed in his burden of proving both provisions had been
established.
F. The Court's Charge
Numerous decisions concerned various types of error in the court's instructions to the jury. The first decision, Geesa v. State,2 38 takes up where
Hankins v. State 239 left off about a decade ago. Hankins eliminated the ne229. 796 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, pet. ref'd).
230. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.06 (Vernon 1981).
231. Gordon, 796 S.W.2d at 323.

232. Id.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id.
814 S.W.2d 159, vacated and remanded, 817 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Davis v. State, 817 S.W.2d 345, 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
766 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
Davis v. State, 814 S.W.2d at 161.
No. 290-90, 1991 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 240 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 6, 1991).
646 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (opinion on rehearing).
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cessity of ever submitting a circumstantial evidence charge to the jury. 24 0 In
Geesa the court dispensed with the "reasonable-hypothesis-of-innocence analytical construct" utilized in the review of circumstantial evidence cases, in
an opinion for the court carefully crafted by Judge Maloney. 24'
The court recognized the necessity of a full definitional instruction to the
jury on reasonable doubt as previously urged by Judges Miller, Onion, and
Clinton in their individual opinions in Hankins. The court expressly
adopted the following instruction on reasonable doubt and held that this
instruction must be submitted to the jury in all criminal cases, even in the
absence of an objection or a request by the State or the defendant, whether
the evidence be circumstantial or direct:
All persons are presumed to be innocent and no person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense is proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. The fact that a person has been arrested, confined,
or indicted for, or otherwise charged with, the offense gives rise to no
inference of guilt at his trial. The law does not require a defendant to
prove his innocence or produce any evidence at all. The presumption of
innocence alone is sufficient to acquit the defendant, unless the jurors
are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt after
careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case.
The prosecution has the burden of proving the defendant guilty and it
must do so by proving each and every element of the offense charged
beyond a reasonable doubt and if it fails to do so, you must acquit the
defendant.
It is not required that the prosecution prove guilt beyond all possible
doubt; it is required that the prosecutions proof excludes all "reasonable
doubt" concerning the defendant's guilt.
A "reasonable doubt" is a doubt based on reason and common sense
after a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the
case. It is the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act in the most important of his own affairs.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore, must be proof of such a
convincing character that you would be willing to rely and act upon it
without hesitation in the most important of your own affairs.
In the event you have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt
after considering all the evidence before you, and these instructions, you
'242
will acquit him and say by your verdict "Not guilty.
The court adopted the limited prospectivity rule and held that the application of this definitional instruction on reasonable doubt would be limited "to
' 24 3
the case at bar and all cases tried hereafter.
The court addressed the consequences of a defense request for a lesser
included offense instruction in State v. Lee. 244 The defendant, tried for murder, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to 10 years im240. Id. at 195-96.

241. Gessa, No. 290-90, 1991 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 240, at *2.
242. Id. at *22.
243. Id. at *25-34.
244. 818 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

1992]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRETRIAL

1617

prisonment. At trial the defendant submitted a requested instruction on
voluntary manslaughter which was substantially included in the instructions. The court of appeals agreed with appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, holding that there was no evidence which would tend
to support a finding of sudden passion and thus ordered the entry of a judgment of acquittal. 245 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Lee ultimately held that by invoking the benefit of the lesser included offense
charged at trial in not objecting to its submission to the jury, and in fact
requesting that such instructions be included, the defendant is estopped from
then complaining on appeal that the evidence failed to establish all of the
246
elements of that lesser offense.
The court found an instruction given a co-defendant naming the defendant as an accomplice as a matter of law tantamount to a constitutionally
prohibited directed verdict for the State in Selman v. State. 247 The defendant Selman and co-defendant were tried for conspiring to commit capital
murder and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. The defendant pled not
guilty and testified in his own defense, whereas co-defendant invoked his 5th
Amendment right not to testify. Over defendant Selman's objections, codefendant requested that the court instruct the jury, in the charge on codefendant's guilt or innocence, that the defendant's testimony required corroboration because the defendant was an accomplice as a matter of law.
Initially, the court noted that the co-defendant was not entitled to an accomplice witness instruction as the defendant was not formally a witness in
the co-defendant's case because he was not called by the State or by the codefendant; the defendant testified only in his own behalf.248 The court also
observed that the general rule enunciated in Almanza v. State,249 was not
appropriate in this case because the defendant did not object to error in his
own charge but only objected to the instruction in his co-defendant's
charge. 250 Nonetheless, the defendant properly preserved the error for appeal when he objected to the instruction and complained on appeal that this
instruction was a prejudicial comment on the weight of the evidence in violation of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 251 The court held that the defendant was injured when the same jury that was to determine his guilt or
innocence heard the trial court describe him as an accomplice as a matter of
law. 252 In this joint trial setting, obviously if the jury found the co-defendant guilty of the charged offense, the very same jury following these instructions would have to irrebuttably conclude that the defendant was also guilty
245. Id. at 778.
246. Id. at 781.

247. 807 S.W.2d 310, 312-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
248. Id. at 311-12.
249. 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (opinion on State's motion for rehearing)
(when an error in a jury charge is preserved by a timely objection, reversal is required if the
error caused some harm to the accused).
250. Selman, 807 S.W.2d at 312.
251. Id.; TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.05 (Vernon 1981).
252. Selman, 807 S.W.2d at 312.
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because he was an accomplice as a matter of law. 253
Inaction on the part of the State with respect to the correct submission of
the law in the court's instructions inured to the benefit of the defendant in
Arceneaux v. State. 25 4 The district court, in a delivery of cocaine case, instructed the jury that it must find the exhibit introduced by the State to be
cocaine before convicting the defendant. The referenced exhibit was merely
the empty envelope from which the drug had been removed for testing purposes. The court rejected the State's argument that the language in the complained of instruction was merely surplusage, a concept which cannot
logically be extended to that portion of the jury charge which authorizes a
conviction. 255 The court emphasized:
Under the Ortega, rationale, the litmus test is not whether an instruction concerns an "element" of proof. Instead, the appellate court must
look to the charge to determine whether the part at issue is one which
"authorizes a conviction". If that question is answered in the affirmative, the particular portion of the charge at issue is not "surplusage".
While it will usually follow that authorization for conviction appears in
the application paragraph of a typical instruction, wording of the other
abstract portion of the charge may also authorize
the trier of fact to
25 6
reach or not reach the ultimate issue in a case.
Similarly, in Warren v. State 257 the theft indictment alleged four items of
personal property as having been taken in the conjunctive and then in the
court's charge the jury was instructed to find the defendant guilty if the jury
found the defendant appropriated all four items. The charge should have
alleged the items in the disjunctive. By not objecting to the charge, the State
unnecessarily assumed the burden of proving the defendant appropriated all
the items in the application paragraph of the court's instructions, and failing
to so prove as to one of the items, the evidence was insufficient as a matter of
258
law.
The court also chided the State for not preserving its own position. The
State, in view of the court's instruction, was put to the burden of either objecting to the instruction, requesting a modification of the one submitted, or
proving the substantive fact therein. Based upon the prosecutor's inaction,
the State was held to a higher level of proof than necessary and the burden
not being met in this case, the judgment of conviction had to be reversed and
the judgment of acquittal entered. 2 59
In Walker v. State 260 the defendant was convicted of burglary based upon
circumstantial evidence. The indictment alleged the defendant committed
the offense as a primary actor. The charge included an abstract instruction
on the law of parties. While the application paragraph tracked the language
253. Id. at 313.
254. 803 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
255. Id. at 271.

256. Id.
257. 810 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
258. Id. at 204.

259. Id.
260. No. 896-89, 1991 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 185 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 1991).
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of the indictment, it did not include any reference to the immediately proceeding general parties instruction. The court held that in view of these instructions the evidence did not exclude the reasonable hypotheses that the
26 1
defendant was guilty only as a party.
262
In Mitchell v. State
the court found that the trial court reversibly erred
in denying the defendant's request for a charge on criminal trespass. The
complainant discovered the defendant early in the morning standing in his
attached carport, reaching into an enclosed tool cabinet. The defendant
claimed to be the victim of a theft, chasing the thief into the complainant's
yard, and into the complainant's open garage where he thought the thief
might be hiding. The defendant reached for the crowbar to defend himself
should he find the thief hiding in the darkness. The court held the defendant's testimony alone was sufficient to raise the issue of the lesser included
offense of criminal trespass. 263 Some harm was suffered by the defendant
under Almanza v. State 264 as the jury was not allowed to consider the lesser
included offense in conjunction with the charge of burglary of a
265
habitation.
In Abdnor v. State 26 6 the court found that the trial court erred in failing to
give a limiting instruction on evidence of an extraneous offense. The State's
witness was impeached by the defendant by virtue of a prior inconsistent
statement. The State attempted to rehabilitate the witness and in so doing
developed evidence of extraneous offenses, over the defendant's objections.
The court noted that while such evidence may have been admissible for the
limited purpose of explaining the witness' prior inconsistent statement,
where evidence is admissible for a limited purpose and the court admits it
without limitation, the party opposing the evidence has the burden of requesting a limiting instruction. 267 The trial court erroneously denied the
defendant's request; thus, the court remanded to the court of appeals for a
268
harm analysis.
The court held that the district court's instructions on self-defense unduly
restricted that defense in Ellis v. State.269 When evidence is introduced that
the victim verbally threatened the defendant and that the defendant may
have acted in self-defense, a self-defense instruction should not be restricted
270
to only the acts of the victim; verbal threats should be included as well.
In Saunders v. State 27 1 the court found egregious harm in the failure of
261. Id. at *5.
262. 807 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Crim. App 1991).
263. Id. at 742.
264. 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (opinion on rehearing).
265. Mitchell v. State, 807 S.W.2d at 742. See also Harvard v. State, 800 S.W.2d 195 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1990) (conviction of capital murder reversed because voluntary manslaughter instruction denied).
266. 808 S.W.2d 476 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
267. Id. at 478.
268. Id. As the case was tried before the effective date of TEx. R. CRIM. EVID. 105(a), the
analysis did not encompass that Rule.
269. Ellis v. State, 811 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
270. Id. at 101.
271. 817 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
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the court's instructions to include an instruction that a conviction cannot be
had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed. No objection was lodged by the defendant at trial to the absence of this instruction.
Initially, the court reemphasized that whether the court was searching for
some error preserved by objection at trial or for egregious error urged for the
first time on appeal, its approach to an assessment of its harmful impact
would be the same:
In both situations the actual degree of harm must be assayed in light
of the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight of probative evidence, the argument of counsel
and any
other relevant information revealed by the record of trial as a
272
whole.

On the basis of the record in Saunders the appellate review "must inquire
whether jurors would have found the corroborating evidence so unconvincing in fact as to render the State's overall case for conviction clearly and
significantly less persuasive. ' 273 The court concluded that the evidence
taken as a whole did not have a strong tendency "to connect appellant with
the commission of arson or with a criminal conspiracy. ' 274 The court held
that failure to instruct the jury of the need to corroborate the accomplice's
testimony was critical to the outcome in the case and effectively denied the
275
defendant a fair trial.
276
In Miller v. State
the district court denied the defendant's requested
instruction on mistake of fact. The State's evidence showed that the defendant, while baby-sitting an infant, kidnapped the infant. The defendant offered evidence to show that she had never been in the infant's home and that
she had taken custody of the infant, believing the child belonged to a friend's
daughter who wanted to give the child up for adoption after birth. The
court of appeals held that the defendant was not entitled to the requested
instruction because the "defensive theory merely negated an element of the
'277
offense."
The Court of Criminal Appeals held that when a defendant "creates an
issue of mistaken belief as to the culpable mental element of the offense, he is
entitled to a defensive instruction of 'mistake of fact.' ",278 The court stated
that the defendant "was harmed in not having her requested instruction submitted to the jury to guide it in its determination of guilt."'279 The court also

noted that the jury instruction given permitted a jury to convict the defendant of kidnapping if the jury believed the defendant's restraint of the infant
was without the mother's acquiescence even if it believed the defendant's
272. Id. at 690 (quoting Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d at 171).
273. Id. at 692.

274. Id.
275. Id. at 693.

276.
277.
278.
279.

815 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Miller v. State, 755 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988).
Miller v. State, 815 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)
Id.
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mistake of fact defense. "The defendant's requested mistake of fact instruc'280
tion would have properly precluded the jury from such a conviction.
G. Procedure In Capital Cases
Significant amendments were made to Code of Criminal Procedure article
37.071, which governs the procedure to be followed in all death penalty
cases. 28 1 Section 2 provides that in the sentencing procedure proceeding,
"evidence may be presented by the state and the defendant or the defendant's counsel as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence,
including evidence of the defendant's background or character or the circumstances of the offense that mitigates against the imposition of the death
penalty. '282 At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court must submit
two special issues:
(1) [W]hether there is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society; and
(2) in cases in which the jury charge at the guilt or innocence stage
permitted the jury to find the defendant guilty as a party under §§ 7.01
and 7.02, Penal Code, whether the defendant actually caused the death
of the deceased or did not actually cause the death of the deceased but
intended to kill the
deceased or another or anticipated that a human life
28 3
would be taken.
Section 2 also provides that the State is required to prove each issue submitted beyond a reasonable doubt. 28 4 The jury must return a special verdict of
28 5
yes or no on each issue submitted.
The court must also instruct the jury that in deliberating on these two
issues, the jury must consider "all evidence admitted at the guilt or innocence stage and the punishment stage, including evidence of the defendant's
background or character or the circumstances of the offense that militates
for or mitigates against the imposition of the death penalty. ' 28 6 In the event
that the jury returns an affirmative finding to each of the two special issues,
the trial court must instruct the jury, and the jury must answer the following
issue:
Whether, taking into consideration all of the evidence, including the
circumstances of the offense, the defendant's character and background
and the personal moral culpability of the defendant, there is a sufficient
mitigating circumstance or circumstances to warrant that a sentence
of
28 7
life imprisonment rather than a death sentence be imposed.
The court must charge the jury that in answering this special issue, the
jury must answer the issue either yes or no; they jury may not answer the
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1981).
Id. § 2(a).
Id. § 2(b).

284. Id. § 2(c).
285. Id.
286. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2(d).

287. Id. § 2(e)
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issue no unless it agrees unanimously and may not answer the issue yes unless ten or more jurors agree. 288 Further, the jury need not agree on what
particular evidence supports an affirmative finding on the issue.2 89 The jury
must consider mitigating evidence to be evidence that a juror might regard
29 °
as reducing the defendant's moral blameworthiness.
If the jury ultimately returns an affirmative finding on each of the first two
special issues submitted and a negative finding on the third issue, the trial
court must sentence the defendant to death. 29 1 If the jury returns a negative
finding on either of the first two issues or an affirmative finding on the last
special issue or is unable to answer any issue submitted, the court must sentence the defendant to confinement in the institutional division of the Texas
29 2
Department of Criminal Justice for life.

IV. THE APPEAL
A.

Motion For New Trial

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 31 provides that the motion for new
trial, if filed, must be filed within at least thirty days after the date sentence is
imposed or suspended in open court. 29 3 In Hamilton v. State 294 the defendant filed a general motion for new trial within the first thirty day period, but
only after the motion was overruled as a matter of law, seventy-five days
after sentencing, did the defendant file an amended motion based upon
newly discovered evidence. After a hearing, the district court denied the
amended motion. 295 The court of appeals held that after the seventy-five
day period expired, the trial court lost its jurisdiction to deal with the defendant's motion for new trial. 296 The court of appeals further stated,
"Amended motions that are untimely cannot form the basis of appellate
''
review. 297
In Fowler v. State 298 the defendant filed a motion for new trial between
the date the court of appeals issued an opinion affirming the conviction and
the date the mandate was issued. For some reason the trial court heard the
motion and denied it. The defendant filed notice of appeal from this trial
court's order denying the motion. Subsequently, the clerk of the court of
appeals notified the defendant that the trial transcript did not appear to con299
tain any appealable order. The court distinguished Whitmore v. State
stating that the Code of Criminal Procedure effective at the time Whitmore
288. Id. § 2(0.

289. Id.
290. Id.
291.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2(g).

292. Id.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

TEx. R. App. P. 31.
804 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1991, pet. ref'd).
Id. at 174.
Id. See TEX. R. App. P. 31(e)(l).
Hamilton, 804 S.W.2d at 174.
803 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no pet. h.).
570 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
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was tried provided that the trial court could grant a new trial after the appellate briefs were filed but under the current appellate rules, a trial court had
no jurisdiction to consider an untimely filed motion for new trial.3°° Further, the trial court was without jurisdiction to rule on a motion for new trial
after the expiration of seventy-five days from the date on which sentence was
30 1
imposed.
In Port v. State 30 2 the defendant filed his motion for leave to file a first
amended motion for new trial and motion in arrest of judgment fifty-nine
days after sentencing, well after the thirty day deadline for filing. The court
emphasized that the appellate rules make no provision for the late filing or
amendment of a motion for new trial or a motion in arrest of judgment, even
with leave of court. 30 3 The court stated:
The right to move for new trial or to amend a motion for new trial is
purely statutory. The remedy must be pursued in the manner prescribed by the statute. The statutory provisions are mandatory and exclusive and must be complied with in all respects, and the court, in
exercising its particular authority, is a court of limited jurisdiction.
When there is no jurisdiction, the power of the court to act is as absent
as if it did not exist . . .These principles3°4apply with equal force to
appellant's motion and arrest of judgment.
3°5
In Port the court also addressed the argument based upon Whitmore.
The court stated that Whitmore stood for the proposition that an untimely
motion for new trial may be considered when an accused's fundamental constitutional right is in conflict with a valid procedural rule, but noted that in
that type of situation, the defendant must show good cause for his late filing,
3 °6
not accomplished in this case.
In Meriwether v. State30 7 the court held that the district court was required to hold a hearing on the defendant's motion for new trial based upon
newly discovered evidence prior to denying the motion, in a situation where
the defendant's motion and affidavit were sufficient to demonstrate existence
of reasonable grounds to believe there might be newly discovered evidence. 30 8 The court cited McIntire v. State3° 9 for the proposition that a
defendant need not establish a prima facie case in order to be entitled to a
hearing on his motion; the affidavit is sufficient if it demonstrates the exist310
ence of "reasonable grounds."1
31
In Cox v. State 1 the court reviewed a situation in which the thirty day
period from the date of sentencing expired while the defendant was not rep300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Fowler, 803 S.W.2d at 849.
Id.
798 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, pet. ref'd).
Id. at 846.
Id. at 846-47.
Whitmore v. State, 570 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
Port, 798 S.W.2d at 847.
814 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, no pet. h.).
Id. at 558.
698 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
Meriwether, 814 S.W.2d at 558.
797 S.W.2d 958 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no pet.).
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resented by counsel. The court started the appellate time clock over again in
order to afford the defendant an opportunity to file a motion for new trial
while represented by counsel. 3 12
The complaint of jury misconduct was a major complaint in the motions
for new trial reviewed on appeal. In Matthews v. State31 3 the court reviewed
the proper manner to preserve error reflected by jury misconduct. The defendant should file a motion for new trial accompanied by affidavits of a
juror or jurors or other person in a position to know the facts in support of
the allegation of jury misconduct. 3 14 If the motion for new trial requires
proof of facts extrinsic to the appellate record, the motion itself must be
verified, but a prison or jail inmate's unsworn writing, subscribed as to the
truth of the declarations, may be used in lieu of a written sworn declaration,
verification, certificate, oath or affidavit. 315
In Shields v. State 316 the court reversed the conviction based upon jury
misconduct which involved the voting for harsher punishment because of a
misstatement of the law concerning parole.31 7 The court noted that Texas
Rule of Criminal Evidence 606(b) was not applicable because this case preceded the effective date of the rule, September 1, 1986.318 The court cautioned that the rule did not lend itself to an easy application because of the
"apparent' contradiction between the first and second parts of the rule.
When would a matter that influenced a juror to assent to or dissent from a
verdict not be a matter relevant to the validity of that verdict?" 31 9
In State v. Hernandez 320 a juror's affidavit and testimony at the motion
for new trial hearing showed that the jury made an agreement with regard to
punishment in order to get one or more jurors to change their votes from not
guilty to guilty. The State appealed the trial court's order granting the defendant's motion for new trial. The State argued that the juror's entire testimony was inadmissible under Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 606(b). The
appellate court, however, found that the State had made no such objection to
the juror's testimony at the motion for new trial hearing; thus, error was not
3 21
preserved for review.
The court in Brown v. State 322 found the affidavit in support of the motion
for new trial, deficient because it failed to demonstrate reasonable grounds
for believing jury misconduct actually occurred. 323 The affidavit referred to
how a juror felt that the jury used the defendant's failure to testify in his own
312. Id. at 958.
313. 803 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.).
314. Id. at 350.
315. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 132.00-.003 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
316. Shields v. State, 809 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
317. Id. at 232-33.
318. Id. at 233-34.
319. Id. (referring to Judge Teague's concurring and dissenting opinion in Rose v. State,
752 S.W.2d 529, 541-44).
320. 801 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, no pet.)
321. Id. at 10.
322. 804 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd).
323. Id. at 569.
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behalf against him but also reflected that the subject was never actually discussed. The court spoke to the application of Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 606(b): "A matter is relevant to the validity of the verdict or
indictment if it concerns an overt act which constitutes jury misconduct
under [Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure] 30(b).. .-324 A jury's discussion
of a defendant's failure to testify would certainly constitute an overt act of
misconduct but such discussion did not occur in the case. 325 The court,
thus, found the affidavit insufficient and no error in the refusal of the trial
326
court to conduct a hearing on the motion.
Similarly, in Goldstein v. State 327 the court acknowledged a juror could
testify as to overt acts of jury misconduct under the rule, but evidence of the
mental processes of jurors was clearly not admissible evidence as a juror
could not impeach his own verdict.3 28 In Goldstein the defendant complained that the court sustained many of the State's objections during the
motion for new trial hearing. The appellate court essentially found that the
the
record did disclose juror responses to most of the queries propounded by
329
defendant during the hearing and that no reversible error was shown.
In Chew v. State 330 a different sort of jury misconduct, that is, other evidence received by the jury during deliberations, was proved during the motion for new trial hearing. One of the jurors told the jury, among other
things, that the defendant was on parole and had escaped from jail and that
he had another charge of rape against him. There was also discussion as to
how long the defendant would serve in prison. The court, thus, found that
the trial court abused its discretion in overruling the defense motion for new
33
trial. '
In Thomas v. State 332 the uncontroverted evidence at the motion for new
trial hearing showed that a person who had served on the jury had been
charged with two theft offenses and, thus, was disqualified as a matter of law
from jury service. Although asked concerning this subject matter, the juror
failed to disclose the information. A person under indictment or other legal
accusation for theft or any felony is absolutely disqualified for jury service. 333 If upon a motion for new trial, it is shown that a juror impaneled
was disqualified, a new trial must be ordered, without regard to a showing of
injury or probable injury or of consent or waiver.33 4 Thus, where a juror
may merely be subject to a challenge for cause, the defendant must show
harm to his case; but when a juror is absolutely disqualified, no showing of
324. Id.
325. Id.

326. Id.
327.

803 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd).

328. Id. at 798.
329. Id.
330. 804 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, pet. ref'd).

331. Id. at 639.
332. 796 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)
333. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 35.16, 35.19 (Vernon 1981).
334. Thomas, 796 S.W.2d at 197-98.
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harm is necessary. 3 35 Accordingly, the trial court erred in overruling the
336
defendant's motion for new trial.
In Greenwood v. State337 the defendant became somewhat creative in his
motion for new trial. The majority of the motion for new trial complained of
jury misconduct and in support of his complaints on appeal, the defendant
proceeded on a limited appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure
53(d). The defendant brought forward only the transcript and a portion of
the testimony from the motion for new trial and he designated the points of
error he would rely on for appeal. His contentions were overruled on appeal. 338 The defendant then contended that there was insufficient evidence
in the record to support his conviction for misdemeanor assault and that the
State should be penalized for not designating and bringing forward the balance of any relevant statement of facts from the trial. While the argument
was intriguing, the court ultimately held that a defendant must bring forward the entire record if the defendant wishes to urge an insufficient evi339
dence point of error.
B. Right To Counsel
In Huff v. State 340 the defendant, after being convicted of possession of
marijuana, appealed to the court of appeals which overruled all contentions
except a claim that the trial court should have held a hearing on the defendant's competency to stand trial. The court of appeals abated the appeal and
remanded for a retrospective trial on the issue of the defendant's competency. After remand, the court of appeals reviewed the evidence developed
at the competency hearing and found it sufficient to support the jury verdict
finding the defendant competent. The defendant, pro se, filed a petition for
discretionary review arguing that he had been denied his right to counsel on
appeal because the court of appeals had summarily reviewed the record of
the competency hearing without requiring a brief be filed or inquiring why
no brief had been filed in the appeal, under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 74 (1)(2). The Court of Criminal Appeals held that a defendant, whose
appeal is abated and remanded for a retrospective competency hearing, is
entitled to appeal and to representation by counsel on appeal for issues related to the retrospective competency hearing. 34 1 The case was thus remanded to the court of appeals to determine if the defendant desired the
342
assistance of counsel.
C.

The Notice of Appeal

An incredibly skewed Appellate scenario was presented in Charles v.
335. Id. at 199.

336. Id.
337. 802 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. granted).

338. Id. at 12.
339. Id. at 13.
340. 807 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
341. Id. at 326.
342. Id. at 327.
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State343 involving a late court appointment of counsel, a late notice of appeal, and an untimely extension motion. For our purposes, the court simply
held that a late notice of appeal may be deemed timely and would invoke a
court of appeal's jurisdiction to entertain the appeal if (1) it is filed within
fifteen days of the last day allowed for filing; (2) a motion for extension of
time reasonably explaining the need for the extension is filed in the court of
appeals within fifteen days of the last day allowed for filing the notice of
appeal; and (3) the court of appeals grants the motion for extension of
3
time. 44

The court in Charles emphasized that without a timely motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 83,345 may not be used to cure a
jurisdictional defect, and Rule 2(b) 34 6 may not be used to create jurisdiction
where none exists. Thus, if the motion for extension of time was not filed
within the fifteen days required by Rule 41(b)(2), the court of appeals lacked
347
jurisdiction to invoke Rule 2(b).

In Petty v. State 34 8 the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal at the
close of the defense case as the indictment failed to allege an offense in violation of the laws of the State of Texas. Upon the State's motion, the trial
court signed an order dismissing the indictment pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure article 36.11. The defendant appealed that order, contending
that the trial court erred in dismissing the indictment charging aggravated
sexual assault of a child because the indictment allegedly did sufficiently set
forth the lesser included offense of indecency with a child. The court, relying exclusively on federal authority, held that an order dismissing an indictment was not an order from which the defendant could appeal and therefore
349
dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dealt a devastating blow to the defendant in Jones v. State 350 which involved an appeal following a negotiated
plea of guilty under Rule 40 (b)(1). 35 1 The defendant attempted to appeal
the trial court's action on a motion to quash but failed to state in the notice
of appeal that the trial court had granted permission to appeal or to specify
that the motion to quash had been raised on a written motion pretrial. The
court held that if the defendant wished to "appeal a matter which is nonjurisdictional in nature or occurred prior to the entry of his plea, then he
must conform to the requirements of the statute and include within his notice what the grounds of appeal are and the fact that he has received the
'352
permission of the trial court to appeal those matters.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

809 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no pet. h.).
Id. at 576.
TEX. R. App. P. 83.
Id. 2(b).
Charles, 809 S.W.2d at 576.
800 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, no pet. h.).
Id. at 583-84.
796 S.W,2d 183 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
TEX. R. App. P. 40(b)(1).
Jones, 796 S.W.2d at 186. The court, citing Jones v. State, reached the same result in
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In State v. Rosenbaum 353 the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the
apparent inconsistency between Code of Criminal Procedure article
44.01(d)3 54 and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(b)(1), 355 as to when
the State must file its notice of appeal from a trial court's order. The court
held that the "appellate timetable for the State under article 44.01(d) begins
' 356
running from the date the trial judge signs his or her order.
In Sanchez v. State 357 the court found the State's notice of appeal to be
sufficient because it was brought by and through the Criminal District Attorney of Victoria County, even though it was signed by an assistant crimi359
nal district attorney.3 58 The State was not so fortunate in State v. Lauber
a case in which the written notice of appeal was brought by and through the
assistant district attorney and the notice was signed by the assistant district
attorney, thus failing to comply with Code of Criminal Procedure article
44.01(i). 360 The State's appeal was thus dismissed for want of
36 1
jurisdiction.
A very significant decision was rendered with respect to the defendant's
right to appeal from the decision granting deferred adjudication in Dillehey
v. State.36 2 The court held that because of an amendment to Code of Criminal Procedure article 44.01(j),363 a defendant may now appeal under article
365
44. 0 2 364 after receiving deferred adjudication probation.
In Marquez v. State 366 the defendant chose a fortuitous time to escape
from custody. The defendant was convicted of burglary and sentenced to
ten years imprisonment, whereupon he escaped. Notice of appeal was filed
after he absconded and the transcript was filed after he had been returned to
custody. Thus, there was not a pending appeal at the time of his escape and
the statute providing for dismissal of an appeal if a defendant escaped custody pending the appeal was not applicable. 367
D. Indigency Status
In Skidmore v. State 368 the trial court heard evidence on the defendant's
pauper's oath on appeal and ruled the defendant was not indigent. The deBerrios-Torres v. State, 802 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no pet.). See also Wilson v.

State, 811 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd).
353. 318 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
354. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01(d) (Vernon 1981).

355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

TEX. R. App. P. 41(b)(1).
Rosenbaum, 818 S.W.2d at 403.
800 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, pet. granted).
Id. at 299.
810 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no pet.h.).
Id. at 456.
Id.
815 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01(j) (Vernon 1981).
Id. art. 44.02.
Dillehey, 815 S.W.2d at 626.
795 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. App.-Waco 1990, no. pet.).
Id. at 347.
808 SW.2d 708 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, no pet.).
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fendant testified that while he was employed at the time of trial, after his
conviction, he was suspended without pay and then fired, that he had sought
employment but could not find work at any rate of pay, had filed bankruptcy, and that his house was to be sold by the bank. Although he received
over $800.00 a month as unemployment compensation, he was unable to
meet his financial obligations or pay for his statement of facts which would
cost about $2,500.00. The State put on no witnesses and offered no evidence
to rebut the defendant's claim of indigency.
The court in Skidmore recited the factors to be considered in determining
whether a defendant is indigent: the nature of his employment, the amount
of his earnings and expenses, and his ability to secure a bond and retain
counsel. 369 The defendant made out a prima facie showing of indigency, and
thus, the trial court abused its discretion in determining the defendant was
370
not indigent.
The court of appeals rejected the State's contention that the defendant did
not timely file his motion and request for a hearing and, therefore, did not
exercise due diligence in asserting his indigency. 37 1 The State did not make
on
this assertion at the time of the hearing or oppose the defendant's request
372
that basis at that time; therefore, the State waived this argument.
The defendant in Taylor v. State373 was not as fortunate. While the defendant's affidavit recited that he was unemployed and did not own any
cash, real estate, stocks, bonds, notes, automobiles or other valuable property or have checking or savings accounts, other evidence showed he owned
a 1984 Grand Prix auto and a pendant with a heavy gold chain. There was
no testimony regarding any attempts to sell these items and no evidence as to
the value of the automobile or whether its value was greater than any
amount owed on it. The defendant did not testify at the hearing but did offer
that the
testimony from relatives. The court of appeals affirmed, holding374
defendant did not present a prima facie showing of his indigency.
E.

The Appellate Record

The court of appeals in O'Neal v. State 37 5 reemphasized that the defendant will forfeit his right to complain about the sufficiency of the evidence
376
unless he requests and obtains a complete statement of facts of the trial.
377
As the court stated in Epps v. State, before complaint may be made to the
appellate court as to an incomplete appellate record, the defendant must
demonstrate that a timely written request for the statement of facts on appeal was made to the official court reporter designating the portion of evi369. Id. at 710.

370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.

Id.
Id.
Id.
799 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1990, no pet.).
Id. at 447.
811 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. granted).
Id. at 221.

377.

809 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd).
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dence and other proceedings desired. 378 This rule likewise applies to the
State. In State v. Pope379 the State's appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution because neither the transcript nor a motion for extension of time for
filing the record had been filed with the clerk of the court of appeals. 380
The defendant in Peeples v. State 38 1 was granted a new trial simply because the court reporter, through no fault of the defendant, could not furnish
a complete record. 38 2 Apparently the defendant was tried and convicted in
the early eighties, was not afforded an appeal or counsel and when he was
afforded an out-of-time appeal, the court reporter could not furnish a complete record. The defendant in Emery v. State3 3 likewise benefitted when,
after timely filing a designation of appellate record, he was not afforded a
complete record because certain pretrial hearings were either lost or destroyed through no fault of the defendant. The Emery decision stressed the
importance of filing a designation of record on appeal. The court specifically
stated that "where a court reporter does record a proceeding, regardless of
who prompted the transcription, appellant is entitled to have such included
384
on appeal, as long as he files a timely designation of record on appeal.
In Stacy v. State385 the court reiterated the rule established in State v.
Daniels 38 6 that under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 54(b), the State
shall have 120 days from the date of an order granting a defendant's motion
38 7
for new trial to file the statement of facts for appeal.
Finally, several cases dealt with appeals from adjudications of guilt, based
upon prior pleas of guilty or no contest.388 In each instance, the courts
noted that there was a clear difference between an ordinary probation revocation and an adjudication of guilt. In the former, the defendant had the
right to appeal after he received probation; whereas in a deferred adjudication case, the defendant had a right to appeal the original plea hearing only
38 9
after guilt had been adjudicated.
Presumably these cases would be decided differently henceforth, in view of
the decision in Dillehey v. State.390 The Dillehey decision held that because
of an amendment to Code of Criminal Procedure article 44.01(j), a defendant may now appeal from deferred adjudication type probation under article
44.02. 39 1 Thus, there is no longer any difference between an ordinary proba378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

Id. at 772.
800 S.W.2d 954 (rex. App.-Austin 1990, no pet.).
Id. at 955.
799 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, no pet.).
Id. at 492.
800 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
Id. at 535.
No. 1070-90 to 1075-90, 1991 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 242 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 13,

1991).
386. 806 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
387. Stacy, No. 1070-90 to 1075-90, 1991 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 242, at *4.
388. Martinez v. State, 807 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, no pet.); McLennan,
796 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, pet. ref'd).
389. Martinez, 802 S.W.2d at 106; McLennan, 796 S.W.2d at 326.
390. 815 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
391. Id. at 626.
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tion revocation and deferred adjudication of guilt. If the defendant cannot
produce an appellate record in either instance, it is highly unlikely that the
defendant will benefit therefrom in the future.
F. The State's Appeal
In Armstrong v. State 392 the decision bore good news and bad news for the
State. The defendant, convicted of burglary in a trial before the court, plead
not true to the second enhancement paragraph and true to the third paragraph of the indictment. The trial court excluded the State's proof as to the
second paragraph based upon challenges to various provisions of the Dallas
County Magistrates Act. 393 The court set punishment at twenty years confinement. Both the defendant and the State appealed; the court of appeals
affirmed.

394

The State's petition for discretionary review was granted to determine
whether the trial court's finding that evidence of a prior conviction was inadmissible was appealable under Code of Criminal Procedure article 44.01(c).
This article provides that the State is entitled to appeal a ruling on a question
of law if the defendant is convicted and appeals the judgment. 39 5 The court
held that because the defendant was convicted and was appealing, and because the issue of whether the prior conviction alleged for enhancement was
cross-appeal had merit, and the State
void was a question of law, the State's
396
could bring the issue on appeal.
The bad news: because the defendant was denied relief on direct appeal
and there could be no retrial, the State could not attempt to try the defendant as a habitual criminal in this case by an allegation of the same or39a8
397 The court cited Sanabria v. United States
different prior conviction.
for the proposition that a "judgment of acquittal, however erroneous, bars
further prosecution on any aspect... and hence bars appellate review of the
trial court's error". 399 Thus, any opinion of the court of appeals deciding
the validity of the judgment in the enhancement allegations of the second
paragraph would be advisory, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and
the court of appeals are without authority to render advisory opinions,
although the court did note that the court of criminal appeals had authority
to answer certified questions of law under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 214. 400
In State v. Moreno4° 1 the trial court granted the defendant's motion to
quash the prostitution information on the ground that the term agree should
392. 805 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
393. Dallas County Magistrate's Act, TEX. Gov'T. CODE ANN. § 54.501 (Vernon 1988).
394. Armstrong, 805 S.W.2d at 794.

395. Id. at 793.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398.
399.
400.
401.

437 U.S. 54 (1978).
Armstrong, 805 S.W.2d at 794 (quoting Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. at 69).
Id. at 794 n.4.
807 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
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have been defined in greater detail. The court order read that the "defendant's Motion to Quash is hereby Granted, the Complaint and Information
are hereby quashed."' 4 2 The defendant contested the State's right to appeal
because it still had the right to amend the information. The court of appeals
agreed. The Court of Criminal Appeals initially cited Code of Criminal Procedure article 44.01 for the proposition that the State is entitled to appeal
from a trial court's order in a criminal case if such order "dismisses an in4 3
dictment," and thus, the issue is the meaning of the term" dismisses."'
The court held that the State had the power to appeal from any trial court
order concerning an indictment or information, and the court of appeals has
the jurisdiction to address the merits of the appeal from that order, whenever the order effectively terminates the prosecution in favor of the defendant. 4 4 The court further held that the trial court 'effectively terminates' the
prosecution against the accused whenever the effect of its order forces any
alteration of the indictment or information before the trial on the merits and
the State is not willing to comply with that order."'' ° 5 The courts stressed
that the appellate court, in order to determine its jurisdiction, must always
look to the effect of any orders concerning an indictment or information, and
not simply to what the trial court or the parties at trial have labeled such
orders.46
In State v. Monroe407 the defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress
evidence of unadjudicated offenses pending against him, which was granted
by the trial court. During the State's appeal, the defendant claimed that in
reality it was a motion in limine. The court of appeals disagreed, finding
that under Code of Criminal Procedure article 44.01(a)(5), the State is entitled to appeal an order of the trial court if the order grants a motion to
4 °8
suppress evidence, if jeopardy has not attached in the case.
The court of appeals in State v. Crawford4° 9 ordered the State's appeal
dismissed for failure to prosecute after the court concluded that the State
had abandoned the appeal by the prosecutor's failure to file a brief after a
4 10
substantial period of time without seeking an extension.
Finally, in State v. Welch 41 the court dismissed the State's appeal, holding that the trial court's judgment of acquittal was not appealable. 4' 2 Essentially, the defendant appeared for trial and announced ready; the State
announced not ready because of the absence of a witness and orally moved
for a continuance, which was denied. The prosecutor read the information
402. Id. at 328.
403. Id. at 329.

404. Id. at 334.
405. Id.
406. Moreno, 807 S.W.2d at 332-33. See also State v. Eaves, 800 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1990).
407. 813 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd).
408. Id. at 703.
409. 807 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no pet.).
410. Id. at 893.
411. 810 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991, no pet.).
412. Id. at 16.
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and a plea of not guilty was entered. When the State presented no witnesses,
the defendant moved for an instructed verdict of not guilty. The trial court's
order recited that the defendant's motion for instructed verdict was granted
and that the case was dismissed with prejudice.
The State claimed on appeal that the court's action was in reality a dismissal and, thus, appealable. The court held that the controlling factor in the
trial court's action was an intent to find the defendant not guilty and its
order was sufficient to do so. 4 13 Thus, the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and dismissed it for want of jurisdiction. 4 14
In State v. Young 41 5 the defendant and others were charged with bribery.
The defendant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus alleging the
grand jury had been discharged before the indictment returned. Following a
hearing, the trial court issued the writ and ordered the indictment dismissed.
The court in Young stated that even if the trial court had failed to order
dismissal of the indictment pending against the defendant and had merely
granted relief on the application for writ of habeas corpus, the Court of
Criminal Appeals would still find such to be an appealable order.41 6 The
court held that the trial court's order granting the application effectively
417
terminated the proceeding and therefore it was an appealable order.
G.

The Brief On Appeal

Several decisions revisited aspects of appellate briefs. The court in Hawkins v. State418 found that the appellant's brief totally failed to inform the
court of appeals how the trial court erred in denying him relief or harming
him. 41 9 The court cited Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 74(f) which requires that the argument of a point of error must include such discussion of
the facts and the authorities relied upon as may be required to maintain the
point at issue.4 20 Thus, the court of appeals refused to review the matter
complained of by the appellant.4 2' On another occasion, the court of appeals reemphasized that "[m]ere assertions in a brief not supported by evi'422
dence in a record will not be considered on appeal.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals criticized various intermediate decisions on several occasions. In Davis v. State 423 the court reversed the court
of appeals holding that the appellant had not cited any place in the record
where his voir dire was limited. 424 The court emphasized that "the courts of
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. 810 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

416. Id. at 223.
417. Id.
418.

807 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, pet. ref'd).

419. Id. at 875.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Switzer v. State, 809 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no pet.

h.).
423. 817 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
424. Id. at 346.
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appeals ought not dismiss a point of error out of hand when there is substan'425
tial compliance with the rules.
426
In Imo v. State the court of appeals upheld a search based upon the
federal good faith exception but did not decide whether the defective warrant required suppression under Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.23,
holding that the Texas Constitution provided no basis for excluding evidence
and because the appellant did not cite article 38.23; thus, the Code of Criminal Procedure was not raised. 427 The Court of Criminal Appeals, acknowledging that the appellant did not specifically cite to article 38.23 in the
appellate brief, recognized that the appellant did cite to the record where
appellant requested the evidence be suppressed pursuant to the Code of
Criminal Procedure. As the appellant raised both Texas constitutional and
statutory law at trial, the provisions of article 38.23 were automatically invoked. 428 On appeal the appellant argued State constitutional grounds,
which was sufficient to adequately raise the issue of suppression under state
law for purposes of appeal. 429 The court held that the appellant substantially complied with the rules such that the court of appeals should have
addressed the contention raised in the point of error which was necessary to
430
the disposition of the appeal.
The court found a lapse in strategy on the part of the State in Boulden v.
State.4 31 The court recited the evidence at length and agreed with the State
4 32
that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction.
The court, however, noted that the court of appeal's decision had also found
433
reversible error on a point upon which the State did not seek review.
Thus, while the judgment of acquittal was reversed and reformed, the court
of appeals decision reversing the judgment of conviction was ultimately
4 34
affirmed.
A very significant development in the standard of review was enunciated
in Saxton v. State.435 The court held that in resolving the sufficiency of the
evidence issue where defensive evidence was presented, the appellate court
must determine "[w]hether after viewing all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact would have found the
essential elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt and also would have
found against appellant on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable
425. Id. see also Morales v. State, NO. 1172-91, 1991 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 269 (Tex.
Crim. App. Dec. 11, 1991).
426. 816 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991), vacated, No. 1101-91, 1991 Tex.
Crim. App. LEXIS 283 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 11, 1991)..
427. Imo, 816 S.W.2d at 479-80.
428. Imo v. State, No. 1101-91, 1991 WL 258860 at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 11, 1991).
429. Id.
430. Id.; see also Davis v. State, 817 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (court of appeals
should have addressed defendant's point of error where defendant substantially complied with
requirements).
431. 810 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
432. Id. at 207.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. 804 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
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doubt." 4 36
H. The Petition For DiscretionaryReview
Effective September 12, 1991, the Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the
following provision applicable to petitions for discretionary review:
Statement regardingoral argument. Counsel shall include in the petition a short statement of the reasons why oral arguments would be
helpful in the event the petition is granted, or a statement that oral
argument is waived. If a reply or cross-petition is filed, counsel shall
likewise include a statement of why oral agruments should or need not
be had. The court will accord these statements due, not controlling,
weight
in determining whether oral arguments will be heard in the
437
case.

The Court of Criminal Appeals also amended Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 220 as follows:
Oral argument will be permitted only on those causes designated by the
Court of Criminal Appeals. Notification of such designation will be issued by the Clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals along with notification of submission of the cause. Should counsel in a not so designated
cause desire oral argument, they may petition the Court of Criminal
Appeals within 30 days of submission notification. Said peition should
contain specific reasons why oral argument is desired. The clerk is directed to use all reasonable diligence to notify counsel of record of settings, but failure to receive notice will 438not necessarily prevent
submission of the cause on the day it is set.

These two amendments lend considerable organization and efficiency to
the submission of cases before the Court of Criminal Appeals. The first
amendment requires the petitioning party to demonstrate why oral argument
would be helpful or why it should be dispensed with by the court. The second amendment makes it clear that the Court of Criminal Appeals will designate those cases it deems important and significant enough to schedule for
oral argument. The court has thus taken steps to manage its own calander,
yet has left room for counsel to protest the decision to eliminate oral
argument.
I. Pro Se Representation
Several cases delt with the defendant's right to represent himself, either at
trial are on appeal. The following decisions are representative. In Burgess
and Archie v. State4 39 the defendant Archie pled guilty to possession of cocaine and punishment, enhanced, was set at thirty years. The defendant in
Archie on appeal contended that he neither waived counsel nor invoked his
right to self-representation but only asserted that he did not want to be represented by the particular lawyer that was appointed to his case. When the
436. Id. at 914.
437. TEX. R. App. 202(d)(2).
438. TEX. R. App. P. 220.
439. 816 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
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defendant in Archie appeared for pretrial motions and trial, the trial court
had already dismissed the first court appointed attorney and replaced him
with a second attorney. The defendant demanded, by motion, that the second attorney be dismissed, after a motion to suppress hearing. The defendant asserted that his family had hired counsel, which fact was proved untrue
the following day when the case was called for trial. The court gave certain
admonishments to the defendant who then moved for a continuance which
was overruled. The court offered to let the second attorney remain as standby counsel, which was refused to counsel was excused. The defendant proceeded to plead guilty pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, and in
this case, contended that he was only given a Hobson's choice between going
to trial with unacceptable appointed counsel and self-representation, and
thus, the waiver of counsel was involuntary.
The court first observed that the decision as to self-representation must be
intelligently made as required by Faretta v. California:44o
"The Court made no inquiry into the appellant's age, educational
background, legal experience, knowledge of the rule of evidence and
trial procedure nor was the appellant more aware of the dangers and
disadvantage of self-representation. Insured, the record fails to demonstrate that the appellant's choice to represent himself was made with his
'eyes open.' 44 1
It is only required that the record "contain proper and sufficient admonishments concerning pro se representation and any necessary inquires of the
defendant in order to enable the trial court to make an assessment of his
knowing exercise of the right to defend himself." 44 2 There is no need for the
trial court to follow any formulaic questioning or particular script. 44 3 Certainly, a defendant may not request for a change in counsel in order to obstruct the orderly procedure in the courts or to interfere with the fair
administration of justice. 444
The court recognized three options available to a trial court when confronted with an accused who makes an eleventh hour request for change of
counsel.
First, at its discretion the court can appoint, or allow the accused to
retain, new counsel. Second, should the trial court deny new counsel,
and the accused unequivocally assert his right to self-representation
under Faretta,persisting in that assertion after proper admonishment,
the court must allow the accused to represent himself. Third, unless the
trial court allows new counsel, it must compel an accused who will not
waive counsel and does not assert his right to self-representation to445
proceed to trial with the lawyer he has, whether he wants to or not.
440. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).

441. Burgess and Archie, 816 S.W.2d at 428 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806
(1975)).
442. Id.

443. Id.
444. Id.
445. Id. at 428-29 (emphasis in original).
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The court found nothing unfair in putting the accused to this choice, as long
as the trial court is satisfied he is competent to make it, and that he does so
informed and with eyes open." 6
The second issue presented was whether the trial court erred in failing to
require written waiver of counsel pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure
Article 1.051(g). The court held that when an accused affirmatively asserts
his right to self-representation under Faretta,a written waiver of the right to
7
counsel is not required under the statute."
In Ex ParteDavis "8 the court once again recognized that the right of an
accused to reject the services of counsel and represent himself extends to the
appellate process, but the right of self-representation and choice of counsel
cannot be used as subterfuge for the delay of orderly procedure in the courts,
or to interfere with the fair administration of justice." 9 Likewise, an indigent's displeasure with appointed450counsel is a matter which must timely be
brought to the court's attention.
Because of inaction on the part of the first court-appointed attorney, at the
defendant's request, a second attorney was appointed and filed an appellate
brief. The defendant disagreed with the grounds of error raised and filed a
motion in the court of appeals asking permission to file a pro se supplemental brief. The motion was denied, but the appellant nevertheless filed a pro
se brief in the court of appeals which he requested be considered in lieu of
the brief submitted by his counsel. The court of appeals refused to consider
this brief, stating that it would amount to hybrid representation and affirmed
the defendant's conviction. No petition for discretionary review was filed.
The defendant filed a post conviction writ of habeas corpus, asserting
among other things that he was denied his right to self-representation. The
court ordered an evidentiary hearings to be held concerning this point. At
the close of the hearing, the trial judge attempted to admonish the defendant
on the disadvantages of proceedings pro se, and stated in part that the court
was not exactly certain as to some of the pitfalls of self-representation. The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the defendant was not adequately
admonished so as to knowingly and intentionally waive his right to representation on appeal. 45' The relief was granted to the entent that should the
defendant wish, after proper admonishments, to represent himself, the court
452
of appeals was directed to consider his brief on appeal.
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Burgess and Archie, 816 S.W.2d at 429.
Id.
818 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Id. at 65.
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Id. at 67-68.
Id. at 68.

